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ABSTRACT 
 
By manipulating administrative institutions, political leaders can indirectly control the policy prefer-
ences that are carried out and enforced within a polity. In this paper, I suggest that precisely for this 
reason, partisan conflict over public policies often generates partisan conflict over institutional 
arrangements. To assess the empirical merits of this proposition, I analyze a unique dataset tracing 
the survival times of all administrative agencies enacted within the executive administration of Swe-
den between 1960 and 2011. I find that agencies are significantly more likely to be terminated when 
accountable to an ideological opponent of the agency designer than when accountable to an ideo-
logical ally of the agency designer. In line with reigning theories of delegation, the conclusion is that 
partisan politics colors not only the substantive contents of public policies, but also the organiza-
tion of the administrative state. 
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Contemporary democracy requires bureaucracy. Even if they so desired, elected representatives 
have neither the time nor capacity to single-handedly address all of the issues facing modern gov-
ernment. In order to economise on scarce resources and facilitate large-scale governance, politicians 
must delegate at least some of their authority to others. A fundamental problem facing politicians 
when delegating powers, however, is whether such powers once granted will be used as intended 
(Lupia and McCubbins 1998; Strøm, Müller and Bergman 2003). Indeed, while relying on bureau-
crats to prepare, formulate, and carry out public policies hold many advantages, it is also perilous. 
The upside is that delegation may enable politicians to borrow the time, resources, and expertise 
that they lack. The downside is that bureaucrats may also cast formal mandates aside to pursue their 
own interests. As Dahl (1967, 21) observed, “if I delegate, may I not, in practice, end up with a kind 
of aristocracy of experts, or even false experts?” Where Dahl’s fears are realized, representative 
democracy is at risk of devolving into oligarchy, a tyranny of experts, wherein the actions of bu-
reaucrats are neither motivated nor constrained by the will of the elected. 
In recent years, an extensive literature in American politics has suggested that political leaders often 
respond to the threat of a runaway bureaucracy by strategically manipulating administrative institu-
tions (Epstein and O’Halloran 1999, Huber and Shipan 2002; Kiewiet and McCubbins 1991; Lewis 
2003). On this view, the choice of administrative design is best understood, not as reflecting a par-
ticular cultural or historical legacy, but as an ex ante agreement among political leaders made to safe-
guard against opportunistic behavior ex post. As long as politicians believe that bureaucrats will act 
in their interest, they delegate generously and leave the details to be filled in at the agency’s discre-
tion. If, however, they find reason to believe that delegated powers may be used against them, they 
write detailed instructions, screen and select for loyal personnel, monitor agency activities, mandate 
regular reporting requirements, enfranchise affected constituencies, embed veto-points in adminis-
trative procedures, and direct appropriations. In this way, the staff, structure, and process of the 
bureaucracy emerges, not as a set of impartial administrative institutions, but as a vehicle for ad-
vancing and protecting the partisan interests of the political coalitions responsible for its enactment. 
In this article, I analyze institutional choice in public administration, focusing on the effects of par-
tisan shifts in government. A less recognized implication of the positive political theory of adminis-
trative design is that when a political principal first sets out to control her bureaucratic agents, she is 
unlikely to be so fortunate as to start from a blank slate. Rather, each new generation of political 
leaders will inherit an administrative state jointly designed by their predecessors. And whereas some 
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past governing coalitions will undoubtedly have had objectives congruent with those currently in 
power, others may well have been guided by quite different preferences and priorities (Moe 1989, 
1990). If administrative institutions are simply instruments of political control, then as the partisan 
composition of the dominant governing coalition changes, we should generally expect the staff, 
structure, and process of the bureaucracy to follow suit. That is to say, all of the various appoint-
ments, appropriations, and procedures that are authorized on behalf of the ruling political elite 
should be particularly at risk of being subverted when there is a conflict of interest between the 
enacting governing coalition and the sitting governing coalition. Conversely, the bureaucracy should 
appear particularly robust as long as the enacting and sitting coalition have common interests. 
To assess the empirical merits of this proposition, I examine the termination rates of all administra-
tive agencies enacted within the executive administration of Sweden between 1960 and 2011. Alt-
hough many contemporary democracies employ universal rules about administrative process that 
apply to all bureaucratic decisions—such as rules about the sequence in which administrative mat-
ters must be considered, the information that bureaucrats must assemble, take into account, and 
reveal to others, or the standards by which arguments, plans, and promotions must be evaluated 
(e.g., McCubbins, Noll and Weingast 1987, 1989)—it is within individual agencies that such rules 
are instantiated in practice. Moreover, universal rules about administrative process are often com-
plemented by rules that apply only to a sub-set of agencies, and structural rules that assign authority 
and responsibility are almost always imposed on a case-by-case basis, for instance, through deci-
sions about agency jurisdictions, management forms, executive appointments, and budgets. When 
political leaders make choices about which agencies that are allowed to operate, they are also mak-
ing choices about which administrative institutions that are to constitute the bureaucracy. 
By providing a detailed account of the politics of agency termination in Sweden, this article makes 
two contributions to the literature. First, I extend previous studies of the choice of administrative 
institutions in American politics to the parliamentary democracies of Europe. While the US federal 
bureaucracy has recently been found surprisingly plastic (Berry, Burden and Howell 2010; Carpen-
ter and Lewis 2004; Lewis 2002, 2004; Maltzman and Shipan 2008; Selin 2015), little is currently 
known about how or even whether these results generalize to other polities (but see James et al 
2015). The Swedish case enables an assessment of the relationship between partisan politics and 
administrative design in a context far removed from the institutions, cultures, and histories where 
the theory was conceived. In contrast to the US system of separate of powers, the Swedish consti-
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tution of 1974 defines an almost ideal-typical singular chain of delegation and accountability, run-
ning from the people, acting as the ultimate principal, through parliament, cabinet, and administra-
tion (Bergman 2003). While the singularity principle has since been diluted by a number of im-
portant developments, such as membership in the European Union and an increasingly independ-
ent judiciary, for most of the observed period the institutional foundation of Swedish government 
closely resembles a pure-form parliamentary democracy, in the sense of Strøm (2000), with two 
ideological blocs competing for monopoly rights on public authority. 
Second, the constitutional arrangements of the Swedish case also enable a novel examination of the 
interplay between ex ante and ex post controls over time. In a comparative perspective the US civil 
service is highly politicized, with new presidents having thousands of bureaucratic appointments to 
make upon entering office (Lewis 2008; Moe and Lewis 2013). By contrast, the appointment op-
portunities of Swedish cabinets number in the hundreds and are limited to top level management 
positions, all of which are contracted on fixed terms and thus shielded from arbitrary dismissal. As 
a consequence, new cabinets will often find themselves in the position of trying to control appoin-
tees that were chosen by past cabinets, not unlike the “appointments dilemma” faced by US con-
gress (McCarty 2004). In some cases this may prove relatively unproblematic, either because there 
simply is no conflict of interest or due to convenient contractual expiration dates allowing for new 
appointments to be made. In other cases, however, Swedish political leaders may well face the un-
enviable prospect of steering ideologically hostile agency managers throughout their entire electoral 
term (Pierre 1995). In the absence of substantial appointment powers, they will instead have to rely 
on their formidable control over statutes and executive orders to influence the bureaucracy—which 
naturally includes the ability to de-authorize old agencies, enact new ones, and redistribute func-
tions and appropriations. Could it be that sitting cabinets are especially likely to terminate precisely 
those agencies whose managers have been appointed by their political opponents, thereby render-
ing the appointments dilemma null and void? 
In performing one of the first large-scale survival analyses of administrative agencies in Europe, I 
find that their durability depend upon the partisan compositions of the political coalitions that de-
cide their fates. Of all the administrative agencies enacted in Sweden over the past half-century, less 
than half remains. One important reason for why this is so is that following government turnover, 
Swedish political leaders tend to displace the administrative institutions that were enacted by their 
political opponents, much in the same way as political leaders in the US do. Agencies suffer signifi-
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cantly greater risk of termination both when accountable to a cabinet with a different ideological 
affiliation than the agency creator, as well as when its top-level management has been appointed by 
a cabinet with a different ideological affiliation than the political incumbent. In line with reigning 
theories of delegation, these findings affirm that partisan politics colors not only the substantive 
contents of public policies (Huber and Stephens 2001; Korpi and Palme 2003), but also the organi-
zation of the administrative state. Future studies of institutional choice in the parliamentary democ-
racies of Europe would do well to take this possibility more seriously.  
The remainder of the article proceeds as follows. I first explain in more detail how and why partisan 
politics shape administrative institutions over time. Next, I present the dataset, introduce the co-
variates included in the empirical model, and discuss methods. I then submit the results. The final 
section concludes by considering the implications of the findings for the literature on administrative 
design and avenues for future research.  
 
The Positive Political Theory of Administrative Design 
Reigning theories of administrative design in political science are deeply rooted in the new econom-
ics of organization, drawing particularly from agency theory and transaction cost economics (Ben-
dor, Glazer, and Hammond 2001; Huber and Shipan 2007; Moe 2012). From this perspective, the 
relationship between politicians and bureaucrats is understood as a principal-agent problem, with 
analytical focus centered on what—if anything—a given governing coalition can do to ensure that 
its policies are faithfully carried out by the bureaucracy. The problem is that bureaucrats typically 
possess a whole range of private information, owing to their superior expertise and other 
knowledge that may be acquired either before or on the job, and the now standard answer is that 
politicians can respond by imposing decision procedures, incentive systems, and monitoring mech-
anisms that work to constrain the feasible set of policies that bureaucrats can pursue. By strategical-
ly controlling the rules of the game, in other words, politicians can compensate for their disadvan-
taged position and steer bureaucrats towards the objectives they desire. 
The generic premise is that delegation to administrative agencies is a ubiquitous feature of politics 
because it can help politicians overcome a variety of frequently recurring political problems. Natu-
rally, the most basic of such problems is to find the time and resources to reach and carry out deci-
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sions (Epstein and O’Halloran 1999). In the course of operating the political process politicians will 
inevitably encounter many other challenges which can be overcome through delegation, however. 
The most serious of these typically stem from commitment problems (Shepsle 1991) and blame for 
unpopular decisions (Fiorina 1987), but also from acquiring accurate theories of how the world 
works (North 1990). By delegating powers to administrative agencies, politicians can achieve multi-
ple objectives and increase their influence while spending scarce resources on other matters, and as 
long as the political benefits derived from so doing outweighs the costs of delegation, they will take 
little issue with relying on others to act on their behalf. 
The dilemma is that for all its potential benefits, delegation also involves potential risks. One dan-
ger is that bureaucrats can have desires and motives that are at odds with those of politicians. A 
second complication is that bureaucrats can have access to information that politicians lack. The 
possibility of conflicting interests and asymmetric information leave politicians with two basic 
“agency problems”, common to all acts of delegation: adverse selection and moral hazard (Laffont and 
Martimort 2009; Moe 1984). The first problem arises when bureaucrats have hidden information 
about their own characteristics and qualities—how can politicians be certain that they are delegating 
to bureaucrats of the right type? The second problem arises when bureaucrats can take hidden ac-
tions—how can politicians be sure that delegated powers will be used as intended? If politicians 
and bureaucrats have conflicting interests and there is no way for the former to learn about the 
consequences of the latter’s activities, then bureaucrats also have both incentive and opportunity to 
take actions against the interests of politicians. In such situations, delegation can produce agencies 
where bureaucrats pursue leisure rather than labor, neglect to supply agreed upon outcomes, or 
outright sabotages political initiatives (Brehm and Gates 1999). 
In this most basic sense, the outlook is of course no different from a traditional Weberian under-
standing of public administration. Modern bureaucracies come staffed with highly skilled policy 
professionals who should be able to safely guide the implementation of public policies; however, 
the very expertise and resources that make modern bureaucracies the effective machines that they 
are also present bureaucrats with opportunity to usurp public authority for their own ends (e.g., 
Downs 1967; Lowi 1978; Niskanen 1971). As Weber (1978, 959, 991) observed, bureaucrats are 
typically just as motivated by status and power as any other public official. And if left unchecked, 
they will seek to further their own authority, develop relations with influential interest groups, and 
veil their information and actions in secrecy. Where there is opportunity, resources will be invested 
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to acquire additional resources, and the more time an agency has to build its assets, the more dura-
ble it becomes. An implication is that unfortunate political leaders may just one day find themselves 
governing an unresponsive army of immortals, as Kaufman (1976) put it, with little hope of chang-
ing course. 
What distinguishes contemporary theories from the old is the notion that even when faced with 
severe informational asymmetries and conflicts of interest, political leaders need not be helpless; 
rather, they can defend themselves by designing administrative institutions that alter the incentives 
and opportunities of bureaucrats to act against their interests. The earliest attempts at explicating 
the nuts and bolts of this process focused on ex-post controls—that is, institutions that operate 
after bureaucrats take action. By monitoring behavior, rewarding compliance, and punishing defec-
tion, politicians can continuously constrain bureaucratic decision-making and protect their policies 
from being subverted during implementation. As long as agency decisions can be credibly sanc-
tioned, bureaucrats must anticipate the response of politicians and accommodate their interests, or 
run the risk of seeing their programmes curtailed and careers ended (McCubbins and Schwarz 1984; 
Moe 1985; Weingast and Moran 1984; Weingast 1983). A problem with active oversight, however, 
is that it imposes costs not only on the agent, but also on the principal who performs it. And in the 
shadow of endemic collective action problems, sanctions may not always be credible. For these 
reasons, politicians will often find it more attractive to promote compliance ex-ante through strate-
gic choices about procedures, organization, and personnel systems—that is, institutions that oper-
ate before bureaucrats take action. Inventive use of administrative appointments, structures, and 
processes can ameliorate both informational asymmetries and conflicts of interests by, for instance, 
demanding that bureaucrats reveal their policy ambitions in advance, take specific kinds of constit-
uency or professional information into account, and have the burden of proof, as well as by enfran-
chising favored groups and granting special interests access to agency decision-making (Calvert, 
McCubbins, and Weingast 1989; McCubbins, Noll, and Weingast 1987, 1989; Moe 1989).  As long 
as political leaders choose an appropriate combination of administrative institutions, the bureaucra-
cy will proceed on autopilot, programmed from the outset to pursue the partisan interests of the 
political coalitions in power at the time of enactment. 
The literature dealing with the perils of “bureaucratic drift” and the institutional solutions that poli-
ticians can deploy to mitigate it has made marginal advances over time (e.g., Bawn 1995; Bendor, 
Glazer, and Hammond 2001; Bendor and Meirowitz 2004; Epstein and O’Halloran 1994, 1999; 
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Huber and McCarty 2004; Huber and Shipan 2002, 2007; Lewis 2003, 2008; Lupia and McCubbins 
1998; Miller 2005; Moe 2012; Wood and Bohte 2004), but the core that was borrowed from the 
new economics of organization some thirty years ago with its focus on conflicts of interest and 
asymmetric information remains largely intact. Although hidden information and hidden action will 
always provide unruly bureaucrats with some room to pursue their own interests, politicians can use 
contract designs, screening and selection mechanisms, monitoring and reporting requirements, and 
checks and balances to counteract non-compliance and ensure that their policies do not drift too 
far from target (though cf. Gailmard and Patty 2012). 
 
Partisan Politics and Institutional Choice 
A complicating implication of the notion that administrative institutions can be designed to at least 
partly determine policy outcomes, however, is that the choice of such institutions should then also 
tend to attract the same kind of political disagreements as the choice of public policies does (Horn 
and Shepsle 1989; Moe 1989, 1990; Shepsle 1992). If different administrative institutions lead to 
different policy outcomes, and different policy outcomes are preferred by different partisan coali-
tions, then different partisan coalitions should also prefer different administrative institutions. As 
Riker (1980) observed, in most cases, preferences over institutions tend to be inherited from pref-
erences over policies. And if a given governing coalition is dissatisfied with a particular set of policy 
outcomes, then they can move policy in their preferred direction by reorganizing the institutions 
that operate in the relevant policy domain (e.g., Jeong et al 2014). 
When should we expect politicians to be the most dissatisfied with policy outcomes, and thus face 
the greatest incentive to invest in reorganizing public administration? If the positive political theory 
of administrative design is true, then the answer is that a given governing coalition should typically 
be the most dissatisfied with policy outcomes when they face a set of administrative institutions 
that have been enacted by their political opponents. When a new governing coalition inherits a 
bureaucracy generated by the bargains of past coalitions, they will want to preserve the creations of 
coalitions with common interests and subvert the creations of coalitions with conflicting interests. 
As long as the policy preferences of the enacting and sitting coalition converge, an administrative 
institution designed to advance and protect the interests of the former will also serve the interests 
of the latter, encouraging preservation. But if the policy preferences of the enacting and sitting 
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coalition diverge, an administrative institution designed to serve the interests of the former will be 
in conflict with the latter, encouraging subversion. 
Substantively, preservation can, for instance, translate into leaving the budget, jurisdiction, and 
leadership of an agency intact. By contrast, subversion can take the form of cuts in appropriations 
(Berry, Burden and Howell 2010), restrictions to agency jurisdictions (Huber and Shipan 2002), or 
replacement of key personnel (Lewis 2008). The single most consequential way in which politicians 
can intervene in bureaucratic activities, however, is of course by terminating the entire operation 
(Lewis 2002, 2004).  
While the central players in this story are political elites, the key generative mechanism remains 
policy conflict between principal and agent. In anticipation of the possibility that their policies 
might drift during implementation, politicians can use their control over appointments, appropria-
tions, and procedures at the time of agency enactment to imprint their interests in the bureaucracy. 
In so doing, however, they do not only constrain bureaucrats in the administration, but also create 
new agency problems for future generations of political leaders, inducing subsequent governing 
coalitions to themselves aggressively wade into administrative matters in an attempt to prevent their 
policies from drifting. The result is an intergenerational struggle wherein administrative institutions 
that have been enacted by one partisan coalition ex ante are unceremoniously uprooted and re-
placed by another ex post. This perspective on the inherent instability of inherited principal-agent 
relationships can be summarized with a single hypothesis: The more the policy preferences of the enacting 
and sitting coalition diverge, the more likely an administrative institution is to be subverted; and the more similar are 
the policy preferences of the enacting and sitting coalition, the more likely an administrative institution is to be pre-
served. 
The bureaucratic status quo will not be perfectly or immediately adjusted to reflect the interests of 
its new masters, of course. Learning about the benefits of an intervention carries its own set of 
costs (Carpenter and Lewis 2004). And before an intervention becomes a live option, the ruling 
political elite will have to overcome all the usual obstacles associated with coalition governance, 
including history, resources, preferences, institutions, critical events, and the shadow of an uncer-
tain future (Lupia and Strom 2008). Moreover, because some administrative institutions are in-
stalled to prevent agency losses from occurring rather than to assure the selection of any particular 
policy, they may well be of use to more than one partisan coalition, thereby generating a certain 
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degree of stickiness over time (Kiewiet and McCubbins 1991). But on the margins, Riker’s (1980) 
observation that institutions are little more than “congealed tastes” should carry force: when one 
governing coalition is replaced by another, the latter will seek to reshape the bureaucracy to its own 
advantage, just like the ones that preceded them. 
 
Data, Covariates, and Methods 
To assess how changes in partisan coalitions affect the choice of administrative institutions, I em-
ploy a unique event history dataset with detailed information on all administrative agencies enacted 
within the executive administration of Sweden between 1960 and 2011 (Dahlström, Holmgren and 
Björkdahl 2014). For each year during the observed period, the dataset tracks the characteristics of 
both individual agencies and their surrounding political and economic environment. With the help 
of statistical survival models (Box-Steffensmeier and Jones 2004; Therneau and Grambsch 2000), 
this empirical set up allows for probing the conditions under which a wide variety of administrative 
institutions become more or less likely to be subjected to political manipulation. In Dahlström and 
Holmgren (2015), we use the same dataset to show that Swedish agency managers suffer greater 
risk of replacement when accountable to an ideological opponent of the appointing cabinet than 
when accountable to an ideological ally of the appointing cabinet. In this article, by contrast, I focus 
on what Carpenter and Lewis (2004) term “the ultimate act of political control”, namely the termi-
nation of an entire agency. 
In this context, the Swedish case features two particularly notable characteristics. First, although the 
parliamentary chain of delegation in Sweden is generally structured in accordance with the “singu-
larity principle”—that is, one principal for each agent, and one agent for each principal (or several 
non-competing ones) (Strom 2000)—there is one important deviation from this rule. Unlike in 
many other parliamentary democracies, the Swedish cabinet takes all decisions collectively (Berg-
man 2003). This means that even though different agencies may formally sort under different min-
isterial portfolios, they are nonetheless all accountable to the cabinet as a whole rather than to any 
individual minister.  
Second, the Swedish constitution also mandates a clean separation between politics and administra-
tion. According to the Instrument of Government, all administrative agencies enjoy formal inde-
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pendence in the sense that no one but the agency itself is allowed to dictate how the agency should 
rule in specific cases or implement the law (ch. 12, §2), and all bureaucrats are to be appointed on 
meritocratic principles (ch. 12, 5§). No positions other than those at the very top of the bureaucrat-
ic hierarchy, such as management boards and agency heads, are appointed by the cabinet. Insofar as 
Swedish political leaders want to interfere in agency decision-making, their only constitutionally 
sanctioned routes are through appointees (all of whom serve on fixed terms), policy-relevant legis-
lation, the enacting executive order or statutory instruction, and annual appropriations. By constitu-
tional design, politicians are thus to check the bureaucracy primarily through manipulation of 
“structure and process” (McCubbins, Noll, and Weingast 1989) rather than by directly managing its 
personnel and day-to-day operations. 
These characteristics matter both because they determine between which actors the relevant princi-
pal-agent relationship is to be found, and because they provide incentives for certain kinds of polit-
ical interventions above others. Though there are numerous ways in which political leaders can 
attempt to work around the spirit of the law when it comes to personnel management in civil ser-
vice systems (Doherty, Lewis, and Linbocker 2014), Swedish ministers face considerable risks if 
they were to take individual action against the decisions or tenure of individual bureaucrats1. In 
contrast, because the vast majority of Swedish agencies are authorized by executive order2, as a 
collective the cabinet can typically enact, terminate, and reorganize agencies as they please with little 
concern for legal repercussions or parliamentary objections. For example, although ministers are 
not formally allowed to replace members of a management board before their tenure is up for re-
newal, as a unit the cabinet can decide that the agency in question should no longer have a man-
agement board. In short, the accountability structure that exist between politicians and bureaucrats 
in the Swedish case is deliberately designed as a relationship between collective actors—cabinets 
and agencies—and to the extent that politicians want to punish bureaucrats for non-compliance, 
they will generally have to apply their retribution as a collective on a collective, such as by mandat-
ing that an agency cease its operations in full or by otherwise circumscribing its discretion. 
 
                                                     
1
 Example goes here. 
2
 The short list of statutory agencies include the Swedish National Audit Office, the Parliamentary Ombudsman, the 
Central Bank of Sweden, as well as a number of smaller committee-like organizations dealing with matters such as 
party financing, remuneration for members of parliament, and electoral districts. 
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Data  
To capture variations in the likelihood of agency termination, we have constructed an event history 
dataset based on a variety of primary sources. In Sweden, any public organization that is not a polit-
ical decision-making body, such as local, regional, and national parliaments and cabinets, is consti-
tutionally defined as an agency. Agencies are further distinguished according to whether they are 
judicial, such as the courts, or administrative, which technically includes the various government 
ministries. The definition is purposely ambiguous to allow for flexible enactment and reorganiza-
tion, but can also make it difficult to determine where exactly an agency begins and ends. To ensure 
that the dataset is based on classifications that closely correspond to actual grants of authority by 
political leaders, we have primarily relied on Sveriges statskalender for identification, which is a com-
pendium of operative public organizations and employees published annually by the Swedish gov-
ernment since 1812. Listed organizations have then been further cross-checked using a number of 
additional government publications (Statskontoret, 1975, 1980, 1986, 1989, 2005) as well as an offi-
cial registry under construction by Statistics Sweden which cover all agencies in operation between 
2008 and 2012. 
Following Lewis (2002, 2004), I trace the life of an agency through its formal functions3. An agency 
is considered enacted when its functions are authorized either by statute or executive order, formal-
ly referred to as an agency instruction, and terminated when it has its authorization wholly revoked. 
The instruction typically focuses on the management form and overall tasks and obligations of an 
agency, but in some cases it can also specify in greater detail whether it should include any advisory 
boards, regional offices, standing committees, or other sections. Although such sub-units may 
sometimes act relatively independently, here they are uniformly treated as part of the parent agency 
as long as they do not receive their own unique instruction. The Swedish Security Service, for ex-
ample, was formally established as a section under the Swedish National Police Board in 1989, but 
because it did not receive its own instruction until 2002, it is not registered as a unique agency dur-
ing the period 1989-2001. Similarly, the Swedish Enforcement Authority has regional offices in a 
number of major cities, but because those offices are all defined in the same instruction, they are 
treated as part of the same agency. This restriction also excludes many ad hoc delegations, such as 
temporary organizations set up for the sole purpose of administering the termination of other or-
                                                     
3
 There is little consensus concerning how to conceptualize and measure organizational survival. For reviews of other 
approaches common in the field of public administration, see Adam et al (2007) and MacCarthaigh and Roness (2012). 
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ganizations, since they are generally authorized as part of a parent agency. All things considered, 
taking the instruction as the core identifier of agencies and their survival times makes for a fairly 
conservative measure of organizations and organizational change, since an agency can lose and gain 
major functions or be otherwise gradually but significantly restructured over time without it regis-
tering as a termination in the dataset. 
The event history of an agency is documented as a counting process that runs from the year of 
enactment until the year of termination, with one observation for each calendar year that an agency 
was in operation. Operative agencies are coded as zero. If termination occurs in a given year, the 
coding changes to one. Terminated agencies subsequently drop out from the dataset while agencies 
that are never terminated remain at zero for the entirety of the observed duration. For example, the 
Agency for Tax Equalization, enacted in 1966 and terminated in 1992, has twenty-seven yearly ob-
servations, the first twenty-six of which are coded as zero while the twenty-seventh and final obser-
vation is coded as one. After 1992, there are no more observations on the Agency for Tax Equali-
zation. By contrast, the National Agency for Education, enacted in 1991 and still in operation in 
2011, has twenty-one observations all of which are coded as zero. If the functions of a terminated 
agency are transferred to an already existing agency, the event history of the receiving agency con-
tinues on as before while the terminated agency drops out of the dataset. If a new agency inherits 
the functions of a terminated agency, the new agency receives its own set of observations while the 
terminated agency drops out of the dataset. In total, the population includes 8723 yearly interval 
observations from 455 unique agencies with 250 observed terminations. The median survival time 
is sixteen years with the shortest spell lasting for one year and the longest for forty-nine years. The 
dataset ends after 2011, leaving forty-five per cent of the agencies right-censored (i.e., still in opera-
tion when observation ceased). 
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Figure 1 presents the distribution of observed terminations by agency age, with the survival times 
of all right-censored agencies included for reference. As can be seen from the event count, most of 
the action is located on the left-hand side of the distribution, with just under two-thirds of the ter-
minations occurring within fifteen years of enactment. By contrast, only ten terminations are ob-
served during the last fifteen years of the timespan. The distribution of survival-times among the 
right-censored agencies is more even in comparison, except for a sharp peak in the right-hand tail. 
The peak is the result of a large-scale reform of the national law enforcement system in 1964, which 
authorized a new central agency—the Swedish National Police Board—along with one independent 
police authority for each county. The gradual over-time decline in termination counts is of course 
to be expected given the nature of the data, since the effective sample size decreases the further 
from the time of enactment that we get.  
 
Covariates 
The main explanatory factor of interest is policy conflict between the coalition responsible for de-
signing a given agency and the coalition with the right to hold the agency to account. As argued 
  16 
above, if administrative institutions are simply instruments of political control, then whatever policy 
conflicts that might exist between competing partisan coalitions will also be reflected in the politics 
of institutional choice. To construct a measure of the ideological distance between the enacting and 
sitting coalitions, I first match each agency to attributes of the political parties that controlled the 
cabinet at the time of enactment, and then for each following year that an agency was in operation, 
I examine how those attributes compare to the attributes of the parties in power during that year. 
Since there are a number of other factors that could make agency survival more precarious, I also 
construct two sets of covariates respectively intended to adjust for heterogeneity in agency and 
cabinet characteristics. I then utilize Cox regression to recover estimates of how partisan shifts in 
government affect agency termination rates. 
I rely on two proxies to account for the level of policy conflict between the enacting and sitting 
coalitions. First I construct a binary covariate, Allied Creator, denoting whether or not the cabinet 
responsible for enacting an agency has the same ideological affiliation as the sitting cabinet, with the 
creator and incumbent respectively being either a social democratic or liberal-conservative coalition. 
I assume that when political leaders design agencies, they do so strategically to satisfy their own 
policy preferences. Ideological turnover in the cabinet since the time of enactment increases policy 
conflict between agency and political incumbent because new partisan coalitions see the creations 
of past partisan coalitions as representing interests opposed to their own. I expect that agencies will 
be more susceptible to termination when accountable to an ideological opponent of the agency 
creator than when accountable to an ideological ally of the agency creator.  
Second, I also construct a binary covariate indicating the political origins of an agency’s manage-
ment. Allied Appointer denotes whether or not the cabinet responsible for appointing an agency’s 
management has the same ideological affiliation as the parties in the sitting cabinet, with the ap-
pointer and incumbent respectively being either a social democratic or liberal-conservative coali-
tion. I assume that when political leaders appoint agency managers, they do so strategically to satis-
fy their own policy preferences. Ideological turnover in the cabinet since the time of appointment 
increases policy conflict between agency and political incumbent because new partisan coalitions 
see the appointments of past partisan coalitions as representing interests opposed to their own. I 
expect that agencies will be more susceptible to termination when led by managers appointed by an 
ideological opponent of the sitting cabinet than when led by managers appointed by an ideological 
ally of the sitting cabinet. 
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In addition to the indicators of policy conflict, I also include a number of salient time-constant and 
time-varying regression controls to account for transaction-costs and factors unrelated to the theo-
ry. Since the range of covariates that could plausibly cause both ideological turnover in government 
and an increase in agency termination rates is limited, they primarily serve to improve the precision 
of the estimates rather than as checks for confounders4. The selection is informed by previous stud-
ies of program and agency survival as well as of administrative reforms more generally. 
To adjust for heterogeneity between agencies, I first include two binary covariates denoting wheth-
er or not an agency has regulatory functions. Thatcher (2005) argues that European governments 
rarely deploy their formal powers against regulatory agencies, and it has frequently been suggested 
that politicians grant them unusually high levels of policy discretion in order to solve commitment 
problems in the public sector (e.g., Horn 1995;  Majone 1997). Since termination is nothing more 
than the ultimate act of political control, unusual levels of policy discretion should also translate 
into unusual durability. Rule-making denotes whether or not an agency has the right to regulate some 
area of human activity, and Oversight whether or not an agency has the right to police regulations. 
Second, as a proxy for agency size I include a binary covariate, Management Board, denoting whether 
or not an agency has a board structure. Large budgets, many employees, and a broad set of func-
tions can make agencies more difficult to terminate (Kaufman 1976), and in Sweden, management 
boards are typically reserved for agencies with extensive fiscal responsibilities (Statskontoret 2005). 
Third and finally, I also include a binary covariate, Adjudicatory Committee, denoting whether or not 
an agency has court-like functions. Sweden has a special class of administrative agencies with a 
similar organizational structure to the committees commonly found in legislatures (nämndmyndighet). 
These are typically populated by professionals and other interest group representatives and act as 
courts within their specific policy domain. 
To adjust for heterogeneity between sitting cabinets, I first introduce a continuous covariate, Eco-
nomic Growth, denoting the annual percent change in real gross domestic product. Government re-
organization is almost always justified as a strategy for cost-containment (Pierson 2001), but on the 
other hand, government reorganization is also itself a costly activity (Carpenter and Lewis 2004). 
                                                     
4
As is well-known, unobserved heterogeneity is a particularly acute problem for hazard models since unmeasured risk 
factors may introduce bias even if uncorrelated with the observed covariates (Box-Steffensmeier and Jones 2004; 
Therneau and Grambsch 2000). If there is heterogeneity among subjects that the model does not account for, the ef-
fects of covariates that reduce (increase) hazards can be increased (reduced) and spurious time-dependence become 
statistically significant.  
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Second, since termination rates may be driven by an ideological preference for “small government”, 
I include a binary covariate, Liberal-Conservative, denoting whether or not the cabinet is controlled by 
a liberal-conservative coalition5. Third, in order to account for the possibility that governments may 
front-load their most radical reforms, I include a binary covariate, New Term, denoting whether or 
not it is the first year of a new electoral term. Fourth and finally, since cabinets that are only weakly 
supported by the parliament may be less inclined to disrupt the administrative status quo than those 
that enjoy strong support, I also include a continuous covariate, Legislative Seats, denoting the net 
share of legislative seats under control by the parties in the sitting cabinet. 
 
Methods 
I implement the covariates through a series of Cox regressions, which is a semi-parametric tech-
nique for estimating time-to-event that combines the proportional hazards duration model with the 
partial likelihood method for estimation (Box-Steffensmeier and Jones 2004; Therneau and Gramb-
sch 2000). The dependent variable is the hazard rate, which in this case loosely translates into the 
probability that an agency will be terminated in a given year, conditional on having endured up until 
that point. Compared to other techniques for estimating time-to-event, the principal benefit of Cox 
regression is that it leaves the functional form of the baseline hazard unspecified, allowing us to 
retrieve estimates of how the covariates affect agency termination rates without need for strong 
parametric assumptions about the underlying probability distribution of event-occurrence. In addi-
tion, Cox regression is also flexible enough to handle time-varying covariates, time-dependent coef-
ficients, and right-censoring with relative ease, making it the natural choice for modelling complex 
event histories.  
To assure the robustness of the models, I run Cox regressions with two kinds of extensions. First, I 
estimate models with shared ministry-frailties. The logic behind these models is that some agencies 
may appear more “frail” than others simply because some ministries carry unobserved attributes 
that make them intrinsically more risky to be a part of than others. Agencies operating under the 
Ministry of Justice, for example, may well appear abnormally robust simply because no one would 
                                                     
5
 Since all social democratic governments in the sample are one-party governments while all liberal-conservative gov-
ernments save for one are not one-party governments, this covariate is also highly correlated with number of parties in 
the cabinet (r = 0.91). 
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seriously dispute that modern states require law enforcement. Yet, other policy areas may present 
more temporary challenges, causing a natural variation in termination rates between different port-
folios. Such hidden risk factors can be modelled as a latent covariate, analogous to a random-effect 
in linear models (Hougaard 2000). The frailty variance is estimated from the data, but assumed to 
follow a gamma distribution, and draws on variation in hazard rates both within and between dif-
ferent ministries. As with any random-effect, the ministry-frailties are generally required to be inde-
pendent of the observed covariates. This is a restrictive assumption, but less so than the assump-
tion of complete homogeneity that underpin frailty-less models. 
Second, I stratify the agencies by ministry. Although Cox regression leaves the functional form of 
the baseline hazard unspecified, whatever shape the hazard function does have it is assumed to be 
the same across all subjects. Stratification relaxes this assumption by letting each ministry have its 
own distinct baseline hazard, while coefficients are constrained to be the same across ministries. 
Analogously to fixed-effects in linear models, this eliminates the influence from all unobserved, 
time-constant, ministry-level factors by collapsing them into the unspecified hazard function of 
each ministry (Allison 2009). For my purposes, the main drawback of these models is that since 
they only consider variation within ministries, they are also prone to underestimate the effects of 
covariates that change slowly or only rarely over time—which holds true for many of the covariates 
under consideration here. 
 
Results 
I present results from six sets of Cox regressions. I begin by including only the Allied Creator and 
Allied Appointer covariates in Model 1 and then add the agency, cabinet, and full set of regression 
controls in Model 2, 3, and 4 respectively. As robustness checks, I then add the ministry frailties 
and stratification in Models 5 and 6. Scaled Schoenfeld residuals reveal no significant violations of 
the proportional hazards assumption. Graphs of the Cox-Snell and efficient score residuals suggest 
that the models generally fit the data well and with no major outliers, but as is often the case with 
hazard models, the fit is worse in the right-hand tail due to subjects dropping out over time. With 
this caveat, hazard ratios and standard errors for all models are reported in Table 1. A hazard ratio 
above one implies that a one-unit increase in the relevant covariate is associated with an increase in 
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the rate of termination, while a ratio lower than one implies that termination rates are decreasing 
when the relevant covariate is increasing. 
Consistent with theoretical expectations, I find evidence that changes in the partisan composition 
of governing coalitions over time affect the survival chances of an agency, both when measured 
from the time of creation and the time of appointment of an agency’s management. In all six mod-
els, the hazard ratios for Allied Creator shows that agencies are more likely to endure when ac-
countable to an ideological ally of the agency creator than when accountable to an ideological op-
ponent of the agency creator. Likewise, the hazard ratios for Allied Appointer shows that the risk 
of termination decreases also when the cabinet responsible for appointing an agency’s management 
has the same ideological affiliation as the sitting cabinet. The point estimates for both covariates 
vary marginally around 0.6 and remains within one standard error of Model 1 across all specifica-
tions, but with the differences decreasing slightly as more controls are introduced. For either co-
variate, this can be substantively interpreted as indicating that when the enacting and sitting cabi-
nets have common interests, the estimated termination rate is about 40% lower than when they 
have conflicting interests. Adjusting for the fact that agencies are hierarchically clustered within 
ministerial portfolios, as is done in model 5 and 6, makes little difference for the results.  In all six 
models, moreover, the effects are statistically significant at the conventional 0.05 level using a two-
tailed test of significance. 
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TABLE 1, PARTIAL LIKELIHOOD ESTIMATES OF AGENCY HAZARDS IN SWEDEN, 1960-2011. 
 
Covariates Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
              
Allied Creator 0.58* 0.59* 0.65* 0.65* 0.66* 0.65* 
 
(0.09) (0.09) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) 
Allied Appointer 0.60* 0.60* 0.63* 0.62* 0.63* 0.65* 
 (0.08) (0.08) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.10) 
Rule-making 
 
1.11 
 
1.10 0.95 0.95 
  
(0.23) 
 
(0.23) (0.21) (0.21) 
Oversight 
 
0.45* 
 
0.45* 0.50* 0.53* 
  
(0.09) 
 
(0.09) (0.10) (0.11) 
Adjudicatory Committee 
 
0.81 
 
0.82 0.88 0.90 
  
(0.13) 
 
(0.13) (0.14) (0.15) 
Management Board 
 
0.51* 
 
0.52* 0.60* 0.63* 
  
(0.08) 
 
(0.08) (0.14) (0.11) 
Liberal-conservative 
  
1.24 1.19 1.21 1.15 
   
(0.21) (0.20) (0.20) (0.20) 
Legislative Seats 
  
1.01 1.01 1.01 1.01 
   
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
New Term 
  
0.80 0.80 0.80 0.75 
   
(0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.11) 
Economic Growth 
  
0.98 0.98 0.98 0.97 
   
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
       
Ministry frailties     Yes  
Ministry stratification      Yes 
       
Agencies 455 455 455 455 455 455 
Observations 8723 8723 8723 8723 8723 8723 
Terminations 250 250 250 250 250 250 
χ
2
 46.17* 88.87* 53.24* 94.59* 78.33* 68.65* 
       
Note. Hazard ratios for listed covariates with standard errors in parenthesis (conditional on frailty in Model 5; 
clustered by ministry in Model 6). Efron method for tied events. * p<0.05 (two-tailed). 
 
In Figure 2 and 3, I graph the joint effect of Allied Creator and Allied Appointer on the agency 
survival and hazard functions, with all other binary covariates at their modes and all continuous 
covariates at their means (based on Model 4). For example, a social democratic cabinet may some-
times be fortunate enough to inherit an agency both created and appointed by other social demo-
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crats. In other cases, however, they may face an agency both created and appointed by the liberal-
conservative parties. These are both common real-world scenarios since any cabinet that enacts a 
new agency must also necessarily appoint that agency. The survival function charts the estimated 
probability that an agency will endure until a certain age under either counterfactual, while the haz-
ard function charts the estimated risk of termination for each year in an agency’s life. 
The survival function in Figure 2 shows why partisan shifts in government are an important factor 
to consider when investigating why some agencies endure while others do not. An agency that is 
accountable to an ideological opponent of both the agency creator and appointer has an estimated 
fifty percent chance of turning ten years old. This does highlight that agency termination is a rare 
event—even when there is a conflict of interest between the agency designer and the political in-
cumbent. Going by the political performances during the past half-century, it would likely take 
decades of uninterrupted rule for a given cabinet to completely replace an ideologically hostile bu-
reaucracy. With that said, agencies are much more likely to remain in operation for extended dura-
tions if they are accountable to coalitions with common interests. When both the agency creator 
and appointer are ideological allies of the political incumbent the estimated survival probability 
increases considerably, from a fifty per cent chance of enduring for ten years to a fifty percent 
chance of enduring for twenty-three years.   
Figure 3 provides a different perspective on the same empirics by showing how the risk of termina-
tion varies over an agency’s lifespan. The received view among an older but still influential genera-
tion of public administration scholars was that agencies tend towards increasing durability the older 
they get (e.g., Downs 1967; Kaufman 1976; Lowi 1979). In the estimated models, however, agen-
cies do not simply become more entrenched with age. Instead, the hazard function is non-
monotonic, following an inverse U-pattern: the risk of termination first increases until just past 
twenty years in and then slowly goes back down towards the initial levels. And at no point is an 
agency more secure than when it was first enacted. Analogously to the patterns in the survival func-
tion, we can also see that the termination rate is much higher when agencies are accountable to 
cabinets with conflicting interests than when they have common interests. 
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While the statistical models are useful for describing general trends, Swedish political history is also 
rife with substantive examples of partisan conflicts over administrative institutions. When the social 
democrats enacted the Agency for School Development in 2003 to assist the municipalities in 
reaching national objectives and improving educational equality, for instance, critical voices were 
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immediately raised by the liberal-conservative parties. In the education sector, they argued, central 
agencies should set national goals and evaluate results. School development, on the other hand, 
should be handled locally by teachers and school principals (Commission of Inquiry 2007:79). Yet, 
as long as the social democrats maintained control of the cabinet, there was little for opponents of 
the agency to do but watch as it endured. Recognizing that administrative institutions are only as 
durable as the sitting coalition wants them to be, however, the opposition pledged to terminate the 
agency were they to gain office. And following social democratic defeat in the 2006 general elec-
tion, the agency was indeed terminated. 
The suggestion that political leaders can use institutional reorganization as a means to circumscribe 
hostile bureaucrats protected by fixed or lifelong tenure may in some ways sound more extreme 
than that they can use it to change the formal mission of the bureaucracy as such. In the US, the 
perhaps most notorious example is provided by the “Malek Manual”, circulated to officials within 
the Nixon administration with detailed advice on how to make civil servants voluntarily want to 
quit their jobs (Cayer 2006). In Sweden, the allegiance of the civil service has been a lingering con-
cern over the past half-century, due in no small part to the constrained appointment powers of the 
cabinet. When the social democrats lost control of the cabinet for the first time in four decades in 
1976, for example, the new State secretary in the Ministry of Education, Bert Levin of the Liberal 
People’s Party, likened their inaugural experience with stepping into “a forest of red needles”, with 
many of the sitting agency heads in the cultural sector being deeply rooted in the social democratic 
labor movement (Levin 1983). As in any other polity with civil service restrictions on personnel 
management, Swedish political leaders will often have to rely on their control over statutes and 
executive orders to influence the bureaucracy—which naturally includes the ability to terminate old 
agencies, enact new ones, and redistribute functions and appropriations. 
Some of the regression controls also suggest interesting relationships for future research, but a full 
discussion is beyond the scope of this article. Briefly, though, agency attributes appear to be an 
important factor in explaining agency survival, similarly to what is reported by Lewis (2002, 2004) 
in the US case. Agencies with oversight powers appear particularly robust in all models, with esti-
mated hazard rates around half those of other agencies. But notably, there is no evidence that the 
rule-making itself makes much of a difference for an agency’s survival chances. On the other hand, 
since the sample only includes agencies enacted between 1960 and 2011, the models may also be 
biased against a rule-making effect in virtue of excluding some of the most prominent regulatory 
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agencies. The Central Bank of Sweden, for example, was enacted as far back as the 17th century, 
and a number of central social policy agencies such as The National Board of Health and Welfare 
during the first half of the 20th century. Agencies with management boards also appear to live long-
er than others in all models, but since board structures proxy for numerous other factors relating to 
the size and scope of an agency it would be difficult indeed to credibly parse out any direct effects. 
In comparison to the indicators of agency attributes, the indicators of economic and political condi-
tions at the time of the sitting coalition perform less well. Although all four covariates have con-
sistent signs across the models, neither effect is estimated with enough precision to be distinguisha-
ble from zero. 
 
Conclusions 
Assuring successful delegation from elected representatives to unelected bureaucrats is a fundamen-
tal part of democratic governance, and to do so, politicians typically rely on administrative institu-
tions that limit bureaucratic discretion—they impose procedures, personnel systems, monitoring 
mechanisms, and sanctions that are designed to bias bureaucratic decision-making in their own 
favor. Precisely because institutions are designed with a view towards the future, however, any gov-
erning coalition that wishes to see their policy ambitions realized must also look to the past and 
deal with whatever administrative staff, structures, and processes that previous coalitions have left 
for them. What they decide to do about the institutions they inherit, I suggest, often depends upon 
their ideological relations with those who designed the institution in the first place. When the parti-
san composition of the coalition that designed an institution diverges markedly from the coalition 
that decides its fate, an institution is particularly likely to be displaced; conversely, institutions turn 
increasingly robust as the partisan composition of the enacting and sitting coalitions converges. In 
the end, bureaucracies never escape the politics that created them. 
To buttress this conjecture, I have traced the survival times of all administrative agencies enacted 
within the executive administration of Sweden between 1960 and 2011 and showed that agency 
termination rates increase significantly following partisan shifts in government. As in the US case, 
the politics of agency termination in Sweden appear strikingly consistent with the well-known ally 
principle in delegation theory (Bendor, Glazer, and Hammond 2001; Bendor and Meirowitz 2004). 
All else equal, legislators become more inclined to delegate and grant discretion to an agency the 
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closer the agency’s policy preferences are to those of the legislative floor. And an agency is most 
likely to have policy preferences close to those of the legislative floor when its staff, structure, and 
process have been defined by a legislative coalition whose partisan composition mirrors that of the 
sitting coalition. In this context, the choice to terminate an agency is simply the ultimate act of po-
litical control—an instrument for assuring that the bureaucracy serves the interests of the parties in 
power.  
Research on the relationship between partisan politics and institutional choice should not end here. 
The focus of this article has been on the average effects of partisan shifts in government on agency 
hazard rates. Yet, such estimates may hide considerable variation. Moe and Caldwell (1994) suggest 
that parliamentary executives can improve the durability of their policies by front-loading benefits, 
dispersing them widely among groups, and mobilizing an agency’s clientele. Administrative institu-
tions that serve the interests of large and well-organized segments of the electorate and whose dis-
appearance would be immediately felt may be better suited to resist political turnover than those 
serving only narrow interests or groups without representation in collective bargaining, for exam-
ple. Better measures of the linkages between political parties, interest groups, and agencies would 
enable more accurate assessments of how deep into the bureaucracy that partisan politics runs, but 
also provide insights into what—if anything—political leaders can do to insulate their policies in 
contexts where institutions and policies alike can be easily amended, as is typically the case in par-
liamentary democracies. More generally, research should focus on theoretically and empirically 
teasing out the factors that determine the political costs of manipulation, and thus contribute to-
wards a better understanding of the conditions under which administrative institutions become 
more or less likely to endure. 
The results of this paper also contribute to a foundation for further comparative work on the ef-
fects of different regime-types on the behavior of executive actors. Swedish parliamentary democ-
racy departs from more conventional constitutional designs in two important ways. First, Swedish 
ministers are constrained by collective decision-making within the cabinet, which ensures that all 
major decisions must be acceptable to the cabinet as a whole in order to gain traction. Turnover 
among individual ministers is thereby made into a minor concern because a change in portfolio 
ownership would only contribute marginally to the partisan composition of the cabinet in any case. 
In parliamentary systems with more independent ministers, however, one might expect to find 
ministerial turnover to be of far greater importance (James et al 2015). Second, Sweden also em-
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ploys a rather strict constitutional separation between politics and administration, with limited op-
portunities for politicians to manage personnel and review agency decisions. To the extent that 
Swedish political leaders want to leave their mark on public administration and steer policy imple-
mentation, the incentives are thus stacked in favor of just the sort of structural reorganization that 
has been the focus of this paper. In parliamentary systems with less rigid civil service restrictions on 
personnel management, however, one might expect the power of appointment to make structural 
reorganization lose some of its luster, generating more stable bureaucratic structures but also higher 
turnover rates among agency personnel. 
Finally, this paper brings further evidence that those who hold administrative institutions to be 
essentially immutable should revisit their conclusions. Ever since the classic works of Weber (1978), 
many have taken it for granted that bureaucratic structures by their very nature tend towards in-
creasing durability the longer they remain in place. The available evidence, however, points in a 
different direction: the prospect of an administrative institution enduring over the long haul varies 
systematically with changes in the political environment. When the bargaining position of the polit-
ical coalitions that were in power at the time of enactment falters, so, too, does the durability of 
their creations. Institutions, then, are endogenous to the interests of the parties in power, just like 
the policies that they are designed to protect. 
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